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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual inquiry and debate on college campuses have been a
contested topics for much of American history. The freedom of the
intellectual quest that college and university students benefit from
encourages speech and debate from all areas of the political spectrum.
For example, students these days on campus constantly engage in
political speech and debate stemming from the current administration
or the most recent decision and composition of the Supreme Court.1
This has occurred for decades. A prime example of this was
during the 1970s, when students protested the Vietnam War.2 Fast
forward to today, students are engaging in controversial dialogue
surrounding political views, which necessarily means that higher
education institutions create a ripe environment for students to discuss

* J.D. candidate, May 2021, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Julian E. Zelizer & Morton Keller, Is Free Speech Really Challenged on
Campus?, The Atlantic, Sept. 15, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2017/09/students-free-speech-campus-protest/539673/.
2
Lovgren, Fred, The Antiwar University, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1972.
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issues.3 A larger debate around the extent of freedom of speech and
what is permissible on a university’s property occasionally results in
conflict among students and a school’s administration, with students
claiming content-based regulation of speech and possibly filing a First
Amendment complaint against their university. However, these
student grievances have evolved into a question of whether a party has
the appropriate standing to bring the lawsuit. In mid-2020, the Seventh
Circuit held that a free speech organization could not bring a lawsuit
against several University of Illinois administrators, finding that the
university’s initiatives did not create an injury in fact necessary to
support a viable First Amendment lawsuit.
The University of Illinois, through its administrators, created
several programs, policies, and protocols that addressed incidents of
potentially biased or racist speech on the university campus by
students.4 The programs and policies were intended to create a
meaningful, hospitable platform for discussions involving bias, racism,
and politically incorrect language.5 Yet, these policies left certain
conservative students “chilled.”6 Speech First, Inc., when it filed its
complaint as an association on behalf of University students, could not
necessarily demonstrate how the students were “chilled,” as the
university’s initiatives merely created a safe platform for addressing
students who offended others through biased and racist speech to
create and foster an environment of learning and understanding
between its students, not stopping it altogether.7 Hidden within the
discussion of free speech on college campuses lies a smaller, more
complicated discussion of how student speech can somehow be chilled
by university policies providing environments to create debate and
free inquiry.

3

Zelizer, supra.
Speech First, Inc., v. Thomas L. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2020).
5
Id. at 632-33.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 647 (affirming the Central District of Illinois’s finding that Speech First,
Inc. did not sufficiently allege an injury in fact under the standing doctrine).
4
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The Seventh Circuit also found that the free speech organization’s
complaint was moot regarding a challenge to a portion of the student
conduct code.8 The university eventually repealed the portion at issue,
but the free speech organization decided to continue with litigation
regarding this portion of the student code.9 The Seventh Circuit stated
that through all stages of litigation, the case and controversy must be
alive.10 A repealed student code section could not be revived simply
for the Seventh Circuit to decide whether it, in the past, “chilled”
student speech.11 However, Judge Brennan, offering a separate opinion
that dissented from the majority’s holding about the case’s mootness,
did believe that the petitioners brought a timely complaint about the
student code section that required “prior approval” regarding studentmade, candidate-focused posters and other distributed materials for
non-campus elections.12 Judge Brennan found it suspect, the timing of
the repeal of the student code, as it happened approximately seven
weeks into the beginning stages of litigation.13
A CLOSE ANALYSIS OF STANDING AND MOOTNESS
The standing doctrine aids courts in disposing cases or
controversies which lack a valid cause of action, a constitutionally
rooted requirement, by determining which party is the best suited to
8

Id. at 646.
Id. The University has never enforced this policy and repealed it through its
formal amendment process, resulting in “a full vote by the Conference on Conduct
Governance and approval by the chancellor.” Id. Speech First, Inc. recognizes that
“this process is analogous to legislation” which would moot the issue. Id. The
Seventh Circuit also found persuasive the sworn affidavit by the Associate Dean of
Students Rhonda Kirts that the University has no intention of restoring the
eliminated provision. Id. at 636, 646.
10
Id. at 645.
11
Id. at 646 (finding that the “policy is not a threat to students past, present, or
future”).
12
Id. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13
Id. at 653-54 (finding that the “relative ease, timing, and manner” the
University used in abolishing the Student Code casts doubt on the permanency of the
repeal).
9
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bring the case.14 The standing doctrine has a long history, starting
from its constitutional beginnings in Article III. Article III standing
requires a complaining party to establish (1) an injury in fact, (2) that
the challenged conduct caused the injury, and (3) some likelihood that
a decision in his favor will remedy the injury.15
The contents of the standing doctrine itself have a long history in
American jurisprudence.16 The connection and link it has to free
speech issues is also lengthy and varied.17 The standing doctrine has
been developed through the years to demonstrate a petitioning party’s
need to illustrate an injury in fact, which is the main issue in Speech
First, Inc. v. Killeen, et al.18 A free speech organization and
association attempted to speak on behalf of various students at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, but ultimately failed to
demonstrate a “chilling effect” that various school policies had in
deterring students from speaking freely.19
HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE STANDING DOCTRINE
The standing doctrine has a long history. It originated from the
“case or controversy” section of Article III of the United States
Constitution.20 In short, its tripartite scheme was formalized in 1978,
where it resulted from 1970s jurisprudence that closed the gaps in
Article III criteria.21 Prior to 1978, the standing doctrine’s criterion
14

Heather Elliot, Article, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When
Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 Ind. L.J. 551,
557 (2012); see also Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, Article, The Standing
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 Nw. U.L.Rev. 169, 176 (2012).
15
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (“SBA List”), 573 U.S. 149, 157-58
(2014).
16
Elliot, supra note 14, at 557.
17
Howard, Celia A., Note, No Place For Speech Zones: How Colleges Engage
in Expressive Gerrymandering, 35 Ga. St. U.L.Rev. 387, 408-09 (2019).
18
Lee, supra note 14, at 171.
19
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 638-39.
20
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Elliot, supra note 14, at 557.
21
Id.
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were a more relaxed version of the strict and infamous tripartite test.
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court explained that the standing
doctrine analyzed if "the appellants [had] alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court . . . depends.”22 The Court’s main policies in creating the
standing doctrine formula and roadblock for would-be plaintiffs arises
out of judicial economy.23 Additionally, the standing doctrine ensures
that the separation of powers instilled by the Constitution’s structure
of separate branches will be kept while also preventing political
activity and legislative procedures out of court activity so that courts
may keep doing their jobs.24 The courts main role is to interpret laws
and provide clarity, not overreach into political decisions that lead
courts to act in a legislative or executive capacity.
Originally, the standing doctrine took the opposite effect of the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Speech First, Inc., where it kept liberal
plaintiffs out of court in the 1960s and 1970s.25 Those cases advocated
for environmental and civil rights.26 But, a turning point in
environmentalist cases where the Court found standing, signaled a
change in shift to the current critical use or weaponization of the
22

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). This less particularized approach to
the doctrine resulted in a long line of cases determining each specific element of the
tripartite test, resulting in a specific analysis to each element, leading to the current
day doctrine. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)
(discussing “injury in fact” as a nonconjectural or hypothesized “possible” harm, but
one that has already occurred or is imminent) (internal citations omitted). It is also
important to note that “[t]he Court has issued opinions dealing with a variety of
special circumstances under the constitutional standing doctrine, to the text of the
note including generalized grievances, to the text of the note procedural injury, to the
text of the note informational injury, to the text of the note and risk of harm.” Elliot,
supra note 14, at 556. The standing doctrine that currently exists in the 2010s is
much more nuanced and stricter than the theorized version that appeared in Baker v.
Carr. 369 U.S. at 204.
23
Elliot, supra note 14, at 554.
24
Id. at 557.
25
Id. at 559.
26
Id.
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standing doctrine.27 The Court gently opened the narrowly construed
standing doctrine in a few environmental instances, but held the
standing doctrine’s formalist analysis close when it refused tax payers,
and the like, the ability to sue simply because of their status as a
taxpayer for civil rights issues, such as misappropriation of federal
funds to private versus public schools and charitable tax exemptions
for a hospital that did not serve the poor.28 The Court reasoned that in
both of these instances, the injury in fact could not be sufficiently
alleged for the taxpayer to be the best suited party for that specific
issue.29
Further, the 1960s gave birth to public interest litigation that
severely threatened the constitutional separation of powers.30
Therefore, “rather than supporting the conservative goal of keeping
broad-based public interest litigation out of court, restrictive standing
requirements may originally have achieved precisely the opposite
result: preserving and enshrining the liberal New Deal administrative
state.”31 Some scholars and academics believe the standing doctrine is
27

See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-67 (1992).
28
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984) (finding no standing for a
taxpayer plaintiff since the alleged misappropriation of federal funds was a “mere
stigmatic injury”); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976). The Supreme Court in Allen and Simon blocked the plaintiff
taxpayers for appearing in federal court, as the injuries alleged could not be traced to
their status as taxpayers, however the Court has also somewhat bent its formalist
approach to environmental litigation instances, where the injury need not be an
economic one, but one of aesthetic enjoyment, a departure from what normally
qualified as a “particularized” injury. See Lee, supra note 14, at 178-79 (discussing
current interpretation of “harm” under the standing doctrine, where economic or
“wallet” harm are legally recognized injuries, whereas other harms, such as
ideological harm, are not).
29
Elliot, supra note 14, at 560.
30
Id. (quoting Ho, Daniel E. & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the
Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62
Stan. L. Rev. 591, 640-47 (2010) (suggesting rise of public interest litigation in the
1960s as a reason for tightening of standing doctrine in the 1970s)).
31
Id. It seems as though courts continually use the standing doctrine to oppose
both sides of the political spectrum’s policy agendas in courts to prevent

6
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used as a weaponized tool for liberal justices to preclude litigation
which challenges progressive programs by various conservative
activists and parties.32 However, that is not necessarily the case. While
critics of the standing doctrine may claim that it ultimately stops a
balanced inquiry of new programs and policies, it actually presupposes
and correctly identifies how the balanced inquiry must be sought by
maintaining separation between the branches of the federal
government.
Beginning in the 2000s, the standing doctrine had swung away
from the 1960s dismissal of liberal-leaning court advocacy, now acting
as a barrier and bar for conservative plaintiffs who challenged gay
rights and defended the Federal Defense of Marriage Act.33 As the
country’s politicization and divisiveness took a turn towards a
prevalent liberal leaning, the Court enacted the standing doctrine to
overreaching in to a legislative or rule-making spheres. From blocking liberalleaning environmental litigation in the 1960s and conservative-based free speech
agenda in the 2010s, the standing doctrine allows courts to focus on judicial
decision-making instead of unintentionally creating and shaping legislation. See,
e.g., Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20
(1997)). The Supreme Court explained that the “standing inquiry has been especially
rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an
action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Governmental was
unconstitutional,” id., and that “relaxation of standing requirements is directly
related to the expansion of judicial power,” United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
32
Elliot, supra note 14, at 563. See, e.g., Glenn v. Holder, 738 F. Supp. 2d 718,
731 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (holding that pastors lacked standing to challenge the
criminal provisions of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act, which added sexuality as a protected category); Morrison v. Bd. of
Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 610-11 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a student opposed to
homosexuality on religious grounds lacked standing to challenge school board's ban
on making stigmatizing comments about other students' sexual orientation);
Daubenmire v. City of Columbus, 452 F. Supp. 2d 794, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2006)
(holding that plaintiffs who burned gay-pride flags to protest homosexuality lacked
standing to seek injunctive relief against city); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208 (3d
Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs who preached against homosexuality on university
campus lacked standing to challenge permit requirement imposed by university,
when they had never even applied for the permit).
33
Id. at 563-64.
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allow a quiet, yet warranted tempering of conservative voices to
appropriate volumes. By closing the door for certain conservative
plaintiffs, the standing doctrine guards against frivolous or misplaced
lawsuits regarding certain policies and programs that have been
enacted most recently.34 Further, it encourages and helps to maintain
the balance between the three branches of government and pushes
judicial economy in federal courts.35
For associations or certain groups of people that are disallowed
from bringing a claim in federal court, the same rules for the standing
doctrine apply. Associational standing must also sufficiently allege the
same tripartite initial analysis that the Court has set out since its
formalization in 1978.36 Associations must be able to allege standing
so that political groups do not have the ability or power to attach
themselves to pet issues or projects. A key idea here is that an
association simply cannot be granted a wider breadth for standing
because it represents a group.37 A number of plaintiffs alone do not
allege an injury. The case analytics are fact-specific.
Speech First, Inc. demonstrates the fact that, sometimes, the
association or interest group has the correct motive and method for
bringing a claim in federal court, and sometimes it does not. Speech
First, Inc. has successfully litigated issues akin to the one in the
Seventh Circuit in the past, just like other interest groups have done,
yet in some instances, a mere allegation of wrongdoing or injury in
fact is not sufficient enough for a court to allow the case to enter into
its jurisdiction.38 Speech First, Inc., and similar groups may be able to
allege standing in certain cases, just not all.

34

Id.
Id.
36
United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517
U.S. 544, 552 (1996) (explaining the modern doctrine of associational standing,
“under which an organization may sue to redress its members’ injuries, even without
a showing of injury to the association itself, emerges from a trilogy of cases.”).
37
Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
38
See Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2019).
35

8
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THE DOCTRINE OF MOOTNESS
Mootness is attached to the standing doctrine, where it analyzes
the appropriate timing of a case and the timing of a court’s
redressability for the alleged injury.39 This doctrine is similar to the
standing doctrine in that the Court tries to adhere to an efficient
adversarial system, but it does not focus on the parties themselves,
rather, it focuses on the timing of the case and controversy before a
court.40 Mootness, under Article III’s case or controversy provision,
“must exist not only [when] ‘the complaint is filed,’ but through ‘all
stages’ of litigation.”41 Mootness also does not focus on the initial
appearance of the case; it focuses on the potential case for the entire
existence of the litigation process.42 The Court has described the
doctrine of mootness as “standing set in a time frame,” and the
controversy must remain “live” for the entire cycle of litigation,
otherwise, there would be no standing.43 In being similar but distinct
from the standing doctrine, this creates another barrier that plaintiffs
must avoid in order for a court to hear their case.
Mootness requires that a case be dismissed whenever a
circumstance would eliminate an element of a case or controversy.44
The consequences and high stakes of mootness requires a
comprehensive structure, necessary to glean and create viable issues
for a court to determine when and where a plaintiff may find redress
for a sufficient harm. For an appeal, the case cannot be moot.
Therefore, “the law of mootness recognizes that an appeal represents
the continuation of a single case or controversy, not the initiation of a

39

Scott, Ryan W., ARTICLE: CIRCUMVENTING STANDING TO APPEAL,
72 Fla. L. Rev. 741, 773 (Jul. 2020) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.
85, 90-91 (2013)).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. (quoting Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91).
44
Id. at 774.
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new one.”45 Again, this principle takes into consideration the fact that
a case’s life cycle must demonstrate standing throughout. It is not as
though an injury can be renewed in time for an appeal because an
appeal is a continuation, not a standalone, new case on the same issue.
Second, the doctrine of mootness also “recognizes that the parties’
own actions can render a controversy moot.”46 It is in these instances
that a case may end because parties choose to resolve the dispute in a
manner that is separate from a court’s eyes and actions. For example,
parties settling a case or a plaintiff’s withdrawal from the complaint
would render a case or controversy moot due to a party’s own
actions.47
While the doctrine of mootness might seem as though it is just
another brick wall or barrier in a potential plaintiff’s way, the doctrine
carries more flexibility than the standing doctrine. The Supreme Court
acknowledged and explained two exceptions to the doctrine of
mootness. First, a defendant’s “voluntary cessation” of challenged
conduct would not render a case moot without a strong demonstration
that the conduct “cannot reasonably be expected to recur.”48 This
protects against a defendant agreeing to alter its actions with no
guarantee that it would not regress to its original ways.49 Second, a
case or controversy may seem as though it is moot, yet cases that are
“capable of repetition, yet evading review” may be heard by a court
because the plaintiff has a reasonable chance of being injured in the
same way again.50 Therefore, this aids in resolving conflict that may
not be fully resolved since it is bound to recur in the future.
The court system in the United States, because of the absolute bar
it sets with the standing doctrine, allows more flexibility in granting
standing through an exception to the doctrine of mootness. While a
court may find that a case is moot, and therefore, it lacks standing, this
45

Id.
Id. at 775.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 775-76.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 777.
46

10
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more malleable review and standard that a court may apply creates
adaptability to hear and assist in certain cases or controversies.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MOST RECENT STANDING ISSUE –
SPEECH FIRST, INC. V. KILLEEN, ET. AL.
The Seventh Circuit grappled with analyzing standing in the form
of free speech on college campuses and in American higher education.
Free speech on college campuses is a hot button issue across the
country, with issues pertaining to free intellectual inquiry and a selfproclaimed dearth in the ability to speak freely in higher education.
Free speech on college campuses across the country create
opportunities for students to freely express their individual thoughts.
However, universities are developing programs for students to find
common ground and understanding through dialogue that discourages
biased and prejudiced speaking.51 At the University of Illinois, the
administration created a comprehensive platform for students to use to
accomplish these goals.52 A free speech group, Speech First, sued
twenty-nine administrators at the University on behalf of four
anonymous students, claiming First Amendment violations since the
university’s program “chilled free speech” and harmed students who
wished to express more conservative, traditional views.53 The Seventh
Circuit, in Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, found that Speech First had no
standing to bring a First Amendment complaint, as there was no injury
in fact or “chilling effect” from University policies, nor were there
signs of administrative coercion or punishment towards students who

51 Howard, supra note 17, at 402 (stating that “[i]n the past few years, there
has been a firestorm of speakers and opinion pieces lashing out against school
speech policies, and tensions appear to be escalating on campus.”). See also,
Kashana Cauley, When Conservatives Suppress Campus Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/opinion/conservatives-campusspeech-wisconsin.html; Elliot C. McLaughlin, War on Campus, CNN (May 1,
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/us/campus-free-speech-trnd/index.html.
52
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 632.
53
Id.

11
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believe these conservative views.54 The Seventh Circuit’s holding that
found no case or controversy existed for Speech First against the
University of Illinois demonstrates that while the First Amendment is
an assumed right for every person in the United States, a First
Amendment complaint is not.
In Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, the Seventh Circuit addressed the
standing doctrine and mootness for freedom of speech on college
campuses. It almost seems as though it was the perfect time for the
Seventh Circuit to analyze such an issue when a self-proclaimed crisis
has started across the country and supposedly chilling free speech on
college campuses.55 In fact, with President Trump’s executive order in
March 2019, the free speech crisis on college campuses seemed as
though it was a legitimate issue at the forefront of the executive
administration. The executive order, titled “Improving Free Inquiry,
Transparency, and Accountability at Colleges and Universities,”
demonstrated the executive administration’s desire to preserve speech
of all kinds on college campuses.56 The “free inquiry” component of
the executive order sought to promote “free and open debate on
college and university campuses.”57 Except, the free and open campus
environment for debates and thorough inquiry acts as a prerequisite to
receive federal funding, which bring in itself another wholly debatable
issue of coercively conditioning a University’s policy in order to
receive federal monies.
Maybe it is not the fact that some students believe that higher
education institutions are continually attempting to “chill” some sort
of conservative, right-wing policies and speech, but it is the disbelief
that higher institutions should instill policies that create a safe and
open environment for this “free inquiry” that the Trump

54

Id. at 647.
Bollinger, Lee C., Free Speech on Campus is Doing Just Fine, Thank You,
The Atlantic (June 12, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/
free-speech-crisis-campus-isnt-real/591394/.
56
Executive Order No. 13864, 84 Fed. Reg. 58, 11401 (Mar. 26, 2019).
57
Id.
55
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Administration desires.58 The administrators at the University of
Illinois, which brought about the newest First Amendment issue on a
college campus, wanted to promote free inquiry of its students and
engage in meaningful debate and discussion. However, the
administrators also knew that leaving students to their own devices in
order to do so created a potentially hostile environment for this
debate.59 The administrators wanted to promote fairness in free
inquiry, which some students found to be “chilling.”60
The Seventh Circuit did not weigh the merits of the claimed First
Amendment violations that Speech First, Inc. complained about on
behalf of a few University students who were members of its group.61
The Seventh Circuit expounded upon and carefully explained the need
for control and separation of the courts from legislative and executive
bodies by analyzing whether Speech First was the appropriate party
for the case. In asking for a preliminary injunction to cease the three
University policies it alleged violated the First Amendment, Speech
First argued that students were forced to “engage in self-censorship”
and that the policies “deter[red] them from speaking openly about
issues of public concern.”62
Case Background
The policies themselves that University of Illinois adopted do
nothing more than create a meaningful, safe platform for students to
express their concerns about other students’ views that are potentially
harmful and detrimental to students. The Bias Assessment Response
Team and the Bias Incident Protocol are just two of the contested
university policies that Speech First, Inc. challenged in its latest
crusade.
58

Bollinger, supra.
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 635-36 (recounting statistics of the impact of
policies among students in calming biased and racist incidents on campus).
60
Id. at 633.
61
Id. at 632.
62
Id.
59
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The Bias Assessment Response Team (BART) and the Bias
Incident Protocol (BIP) are programs that the University of Illinois
administration uses to address concerns of students who demonstrate
views that are discriminatory, racist, or otherwise harmful in some
nature.63 Any member of the student body may report an incident of
biased or discriminatory speech with BART, that is attached to the
Office for Student Conflict Resolution.64 After reporting through an
anonymous webform, it is dumped into an internal database.65 From
there, BART members discuss the database reports in bi-weekly
meetings to determine whether it is necessary to reach out to all
students involved in the incident.66 If a BART meeting does happen,
BART cannot require students to change their behavior nor does it
have the authority to issues sanctions if the student chooses not to do
so.67 In addition, there is no formal sanction or punishment of any kind
if a student is reported to BART.68
BIP is a separate, but identical, program and policy to BART that
operates for university houses and does not come with campus-wide
jurisdiction. BIP addresses bias-motivated incidents in residence halls
at the university and within university housing.69 Again, there are no
sanctions or foreseeable punishment that a student would encounter
for either being reported to BIP through its anonymous webform.70
Speech First, Inc. admitted that neither it nor its members had any
firsthand knowledge of BART or BIP; it relied on students’
63

Id. “Bias-motivated incidents” are “actions, or expressions that are
motivated, at least in party, by prejudice against or hostility toward a person (or
group) because of the person’s (or group’s) actual or perceived age, disability/ability
status, ethnicity, gender, gender identity/expression, national origin, race,
religion/spirituality, sexual orientation, socioeconomic class, etc,” according to
BART standards. Id. at 632-33.
64
Id. at 633.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 633-34.
67
Id. at 634-35.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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communications about these policies in filing suit.71 The president of
Speech First, Inc. only asserted that the identity of the student who
committed the bias-motivated incident may be used in the future to
target students.72 Yet, the University challenged this argument, as
BART and BIP conversations are entirely voluntary and actions and
sanctions against the student do not occur solely because of the
anonymous complaint that would be filed in the webform.73
While BART and BIP do not have any formalized punishment,
policy, or consequence attached to a finding of biased-motivated
speech, BART does publish an annual report of incidents with
generalized data, removing any identifying markers of students
involved.74 BART and BIP incidents may also be connected to
instances of behavior that coincide with a violation of the University’s
Student Code, such as physical violence, sexual harassment, or
stalking, but BART incidents themselves are not handled through the
University’s formalized disciplinary system.75 Yet, these University
Student Code violations that are initially reported through the BART
and BIP systems are not referred to the University’s formal
71

Id. at 634.
Id. Notably, Speech First’s National President, Nicole Neily, reported that
one student advisor told a BART-reported student “‘that he could see from the
student’s files that the student had met with someone from the BART.’” Id. But, the
Seventh Circuit did not expand further on this point in its decision, as “Neily
provide[d] no other detail about BART and its operations.” Id. While a BART report
could be seen on a student’s records, the Seventh Circuit still found that there were
still no particularized injuries coinciding with this issue. Id. at 643-44.
73
Id. at 634.
74
Id. at 633. The Seventh Circuit’s decision lists three examples of BART
incidents published in its annual report, including removal of chalked phrases, such
as “Women are Worthless” and “Go White Privilege.” Id. at 633-34. Other instances
of face-to-face student speech reported to BART include a student telling another
that he voted for Trump to deport another student and a posting on Facebook about
an “Affirmative Action Bake Sale” where students would be charged different prices
for the food based on race and ethnicity. Id. The Annual Report noted that chalked
saying were removed within an hour of being reported to BART and that some
students involved in the latter two instances met with a member of the BART team.
Id. No other disciplinary measures were listed in the Annual Report samples.
75
Id.
72
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disciplinary process, nor are they investigated by police from a BART
referral.76 This enforces and upholds the University’s goal to provide a
platform for meaningful discussion and educational opportunities
rather than punish students for content-based speech.77
Additionally, Speech First, Inc. challenged another policy named
as No Contact Directives (“NCDs”).78 The University’s Student
Disciplinary Procedures explained that disciplinary officers from the
university may direct an individual student who is subject to student
discipline to have no contact with one or more persons with an NCD.79
There is no physical distance requirement that students under NCDs
must avoid each other, but any form of communication with the sole
purpose of provoking or intimidating discourse between the students is
highly discouraged.80 There is only a recommendation of the
punishment of dismissal from the University if a student violates an
NCD he or she has with another student.81
However, again, the University detailed that it only imposes
NCDs in response to violations of the student code to prevent potential
violations, and that no student has ever been subject to NCDs for
expression alone.82 There is no formal punishment given to students
who choose to not follow the NCD, and outside of the provocation or
intimidation contexts, students under NCDs may interact and
communicate with each other.83 The only instance of an NCD
mentioned in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion stemmed from two
students after one attended an anti-Trump rally and attacked students
in attendance.84 The second student subsequently wrote a student

76

Id. at 634.
Id.
78
Id. at 635-36.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 636.
82
Id. at 635-36.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 636.
77
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newspaper article about the entire incident.85 The official NCD
suggested that the second student not write about the first student, but
the students were both aware that this was not a disciplinary charge,
just a recommendation.86 Further, the second student was still
permitted to write journalistic stories about the first student.87 The
students were encouraged to create physical spaces in their
interactions, but the two students’ speech was not restricted. It was
only provoking or intimidating contact between the two that was
discouraged by the University.
The last policy that Speech First, Inc. cited at the University of
Illinois for chilling speech was Student Code § 2-407, which
prohibited students from “posting and distributing leaflets, handbills,
and other types of materials” about candidates for non-campus
elections without prior approval.88 Students who ignored this section
of the student code did face disciplinary action, including reprimand,
censure, probation, suspension, and dismissal from the University.89
However, the record before the Seventh Circuit lacked any evidence
that the University did, in fact, enforce this section of the student
code.90
Soon after the initiation of Speech First’s case against Killeen and
other defendants, Student Code § 2-407 was repealed.91 The Associate
Dean of Students issued a University-sanctioned statement clarifying
that the University had no intention of restoring this eliminated
provision.92 Further, the repeal took immediate effect without delay by
the University Chancellor.93 The University was swift to amend its

85

Id.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 636-37.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 637.
92
Id.
93
Id.
86
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student code by repealing this certain provision by students, faculty,
and administrators sitting on the Urbana-Champaign Senate.
On appeal, Speech First, Inc. only argued that the District Court
for the Central District of Illinois erred when it found that Speech
First, Inc. did not allege an injury in fact under the standing doctrine
analysis.94 Under current standing doctrine jurisprudence, the
“chilled” speech that Speech First intended to demonstrate, that the
University prevented students from engaging in, was not a sufficient
injury. Therefore, Speech First, Inc. could not be the most appropriate
and best suited party for this particular lawsuit.
Comparing and Contrasting with Other Circuits
In analyzing BART and BIP, the Seventh Circuit found that there
was no alleged injury for a few significant reasons. First, it agreed
with the district court that “[b]ias-motivated speech alone is not a
Student Code violation,” as any disciplinary process attached to BART
or BIP does not apply to students whose views expression was
supposedly chilled or limited under these policies.95 Speech First, Inc.
does not dispute this finding from the district court.96 Therefore, this
first reason shows that its members did not “face a credible threat of
enforcement” by the University for more conservative, expressed
views.97
Second, the Seventh Circuit compared this case to Abbott v.
Pastides, 900 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2018). The main similarity between
these cases is that the students in Killeen were unable to make with
clarity and specificity the speech they would have preferred to
express.98 Therefore, it was unlikely that the students would have been
94

Id. at 637-38.
Id. at 639.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 640. The Seventh Circuit noted that Abbott v. Pastides, 900 F.3d 160
(4th Cir. 2018), was instructive to its Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen analysis, as it
demonstrated a mandatory, compulsory event rather than a voluntary, optional one
that had a weighted, implied threat of chilled speech, in part silenced by the
95
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reported to either BART or BIP. In Abbott, students received official
letters instructing them to attend a mandatory meeting with the
University of South Carolina officials after the students hosted a “Free
Speech” event.99 The Fourth Circuit found that the Abbott plaintiffs
failed to identify any speech event they planned or desired to sponsor
at this event.100 Therefore, the Abbott plaintiffs missed illustrating how
the defendants deterred “some specific intended act of expression
protected by the First Amendment.”101 Without any specific
statements of what particular speech students wished to engage in, it is
difficult to imagine any sort of injury in fact, as a claimed First
Amendment right to expression was not blocked or chilled by a
university policy which aims to protect students against bias-motivated
or racist speech.102 Claimed lack of expression alone does not
constitute any recognizable injury in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion for
Article III standing for an alleged First Amendment violation.103
Since most conversations with BART were optional and in no
way mandatory for students, the district court finding that the lack of
any discipline by BART or BIP with identified students also resulted
in no harm or injury to the student.104 The Seventh Circuit
distinguished this finding and reasoning from Bantam Books, Inc. v.

University of South Carolina. While the University of South Carolina’s goals were
the same at the University of Illinois’s in attempting to prevent incidences of biased
and racist speech, among other things, the execution of this goal ultimately is what
differed between the two higher education institutions. Yet, the articulation of what
speech was exactly “chilled speech” by the two universities led the Seventh Circuit
to its ultimate conclusion.
99
Abbott, 900 F.3d at 163.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 171.
102
Id.
103
Again, this brings to prominence the formalized, tripartite Article III
standing scheme that federal courts must utilize. Otherwise, plaintiffs could
potentially bring frivolous lawsuits that are not redressable, nor would it be equitable
for a court to potentially admonish the defendant if the plaintiff cannot allege a
sufficient injury.
104
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 640.
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Sullivan.105 In Bantam Books, the Rhode Island Commission to
Encourage Morality in Youth notified a publication distributor dozens
of times, stating that certain publications were inappropriate for sales
to children.106 The complaints were followed up with police
visitations.107 The Supreme Court found that these complaints were
“virtually . . . orders” that were disguised and could be explained as
“thinly veiled threats.”108 Here, though, since the students’
involvement was optional and no threats were made for
noncompliance following a BART or BP incident report, there were
“essentially no consequences.”109
Since the University’s policies essentially held no consequences
for students, the Seventh Circuit held fast to the traditional
understanding of the standing doctrine, contemplating actual injury in
fact, rather than a far-flung alleged injury that had a small chance of
occurring in the future. In a further comparison with Abbott, the
Seventh Circuit also explained that the Abbott mandatory meeting with
administrative officials at the University of South Carolina, again,
distinguishes itself from the voluntary nature of BART and BIP at the
University of Illinois.110 Plainly put by the Fourth Circuit in Abbott,
[A] threatened administrative inquiry will not be treated as an
ongoing First Amendment inquiry sufficient to confer
standing unless the administrative process itself imposes
some significant burden. . . . Even an objectively reasonable
“threat” that the plaintiffs might someday have to meet briefly
with a University official in a non-adversarial format, to
provide their own version of events in response to student
complaints, cannot be characterized as the equivalent of a
credible threat of “enforcement” or as the kind of
105

372 U.S. 58 (1963).
Id. at 59-61.
107
Id. at 68.
108
Id.
109
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 640-41.
110
Id. at 641; Abbott, 900 F.3d at 171.
106
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make

Id. at 179 (emphasis added). Therefore, an optional meeting at the
University of Illinois cannot allege a sufficient injury in fact where a
mandatory one at the University of South Carolina does not. An
optional meeting at the University of Illinois would allow all students
involved an opportunity to share their stories, rather than acting as a
disciplinary measure. Again, the goal to provide a safe platform to
discuss and resolve incidents of biased-motivated speech with no
coercion to participate allows for learning, rather than condemnation
for reported students.111
The last argument that Speech First, Inc. claimed attempted to
compare the alleged First Amendment violation here with
Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart.112 It claimed that the University of
Illinois “can chill speech without threatening an investigation or
prosecution, and even without authority to take any official action.’”113
However, the threat of an investigation in Backpage.com issued from
Sheriff Dart to prevent sex trafficking was sent on official letterhead
that demanded action, and also condemned the plaintiff’s activities and
reminded them of their potential liability.114 Again, the Seventh
Circuit readily distinguished Sheriff Dart’s letter from the University’s
administrators ask for students to attend a voluntary meeting.115 The
nature of Sheriff Dart’s letter, with the impact it had on official
letterhead and reminder of potential liability, acted as a more coercive
tool in obtaining the plaintiffs’ compliance, as opposed to a requested,
but optional, meeting between a university administrator and

111

Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 641.
807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015).
113
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 641-42 (quoting Backpage.com, LLC, 807
F.3d at 236).
114
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 642 (describing Backpage.com, LLC, 807
F.3d at 236).
115
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 642.
112
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students.116 The Seventh Circuit stated that “when the majority of
students BART contacts decline a meeting, Speech First’s speculation
that BART’s outreach carries an implicit threat of consequences lacks
merit.”117
Regarding NCDs, there was an insufficient injury in fact, as no
protected speech was prevented from the NCDs themselves. The
NCDs acted as a protective tool to prevent incidences of racism and
bias between students.118 It was not intended to chill speech, just its
direction in situations where the speech could be found volatile and
negatively impact students.119 The University of Illinois still
encourages students to engage in intellectual inquiry and discourse,
even with the NCDs in place.120 And, again, Speech First failed to
demonstrate any evidence that showed how students feared from
expressing a particular viewpoint with the supposed threat of an NCD
being issued to them.121 The argued self-censorship that Speech First,
Inc. alleges with NCDs could not be found in the current findings
before the Seventh Circuit.122
The Seventh Circuit did not spend a lot of its resources discussing
the doctrine of mootness for Student Code § 2-407.123 Student Code §
2-407 was a “prior approval” rule that “prohibited students from
post[ing] and distributing leaflets, handbills, and other types of
materials about candidates for non-campus elections without” consent
from the University.124 While a party’s actions may render a case or
controversy moot, it is not a dispositive indicator that no case or

116

Id.
Id.
118
Id. at 633.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 644.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 645-46.
124
Id. at 636.
117
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controversy exists.125 Rather, there must be some sort of affirmative
action by the party to illustrate that it will not slip back into its old
ways or habits.126 The swift repeal of the student code provision by the
University Senate may seem suspicious to some, but it did not raise
any alarms with the Seventh Circuit. Namely, the University
contended and demonstrated that it does not intend to reinstate the
challenged provision, nor does it want to amend a new one in its place
into the student code.127
Judge Brennan was the only judge on the panel to dissent
regarding the issue of mootness of repealed Student Code § 2-407. He
agreed with the other judge’s in that BART, BIP, and NCDs did not
reveal any injury in fact to sustain standing in this case, but the student
code provision was not denounced with the standards of “heavy
burden” and absolute clearness that attaches to a doctrine of mootness
question in school and education cases.128 To Judge Brennan, the swift
repeal of the student code provision shortly after the case started its
litigation life cycle was suspicious.129 The firm denouncement was not
firm enough, according to other education and school district cases
125

Id.; see Fed'n of Advert. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago
("Federation"), 326 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that where a policy’s
repeal is not genuine, then a court may refuse to find that the case is moot); see also
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33, 73 S. Ct. 894, 97 L. Ed.
1303 (1953) (stating that “a defendant's voluntary cessation of challenged conduct
will not render a case moot because the defendant remains 'free to return to his old
ways.’”). A case only becomes moot if it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000).
126
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632-33.
127
First Speech, Inc., 968 F.3d at 646.
128
Id. at 653-54; Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 189. If there was no
absolute clearness of a defendant’s willingness to not return to his old ways,
voluntary compliance could merely be demonstrative and persuade a court to dismiss
the case. Id. (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc.,
393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). A defendant’s voluntary compliance of dismissing or
repealing a policy without a firm adherence to condemning it does not render a case
moot. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 189.
129
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 653.
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involving the same issue of mootness. He reasoned that the University
of Illinois’s failure “to document in any way its decision to make the
change permanent” would be sufficient to present a live controversy
that is not already moot.130
A further reconciliation between the heavy burden and mootness
doctrine that Judge Brennan analyzes would also require or expect the
University to adopt a “forward-looking, binding, and formal policy
position” against the past student code provision as evidence of not
returning to its old ways.131 A simple declaration of repealing the
student code provision with an announcement of an intention to not
instill it again in a disguised form was not sufficient to maintain the
issue as moot, according to Judge Brennan.132
While Judge Brennan differs from his colleagues in the Seventh
Circuit regarding the doctrine of mootness, the University’s
denouncement and repeal must be taken in good faith.133 Therefore,
while the burden that the majority and Judge Brennan used in their
analyses differs, the repeal of the student code provision announces
the same result. It is important to note that while the standing doctrine
and mootness doctrine application here seems to revert to the old,
formalistic scheme derived from Article III, the Seventh Circuit
correctly applied caselaw to Speech First, Inc.’s complaint against the
University of Illinois. There was no realized injury in fact. The only
issue of “chilled” speech resulted from students’ unrealized fear, not
from actual instances in which protected speech was extinguished by
the University.134 The free speech crisis and supposed free intellectual
inquiry dearth on college campuses does not present itself here, as the
130

Id.; Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Concord Comm. Sch., 885 F.3d
1038, 1052 (7th Cir. 2018).
131
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 656.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 646 (stating that the “University is a public entity and an arm of the
state government of Illinois, and therefore receives the presumption that it acts in
good faith.”).
134
Id. at 633. The parties do not dispute that, “if its members were to have
standing, Speech First would have associational standing,” however, Speech First
only contested the injury in fact portion of the tripartite standing test. Id. at 638.
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University of Illinois was only creating a platform for understanding
during speech and debate; not a complete barrier of accessing other
students’ varied opinions.135
A Close Call – How Schlissel and Killeen Differ, Even with Nearly
Identical Facts
The Seventh Circuit deviated and distinguished Killeen from its
cousin in the Sixth Circuit, Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel.136 In a
nearly identical case featuring students at the University of Michigan,
the Sixth Circuit held that the university students had standing.137 The
University of Michigan’s policies for encouraging a safe,
accommodating space for students to voice their opinions on a neutral
platform, while also monitoring for harassing language, were
actionable under the standing doctrine.138
The Sixth Circuit differed from the Seventh Circuit, finding that
the students had standing, as the injury in fact was not as far flung and
more realized than the students at the University of Illinois.139 The
Sixth Circuit also granted Speech First, Inc. associational standing,
rather than denying it altogether.140 While the policies between the two
universities accomplish the same goals, the Sixth Circuit found that
the University of Michigan’s policies does, in fact, have an injury in
fact, where students demonstrated that their opinions and speech were
“chilled” due to potential punishment by the university.141 The Sixth
Circuit stated that the policy similar to the University of Illinois’s
BART protocol and program that it “subjects students to processes
135

Id. at 633; Bollinger, supra.
939 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2019).
137
Id. at 770-71. An important point to note is that Speech First, Inc. was given
associational standing in Schlissel. Id. at 765. Both students have an
138
Id.
139
Id. at 765-66.
140
Id.
141
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 643; Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d
at 764-65.
136
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which could lead to . . . punishments,” and had the potential to also
lead to “consequences that [the student] would otherwise not face.”142
In comparison to the University of Illinois’s BART policy and
protocol, Speech First did not allege any viable and valuable evidence
that a student’s failure to respond to an instance of outreach or accept
a meeting with the BART team.143 Additionally, the invitation to
attend a BART meeting or outreach instance similarly did not feel like
an “implicit threat” to students.144 The University of Illinois’s students
virtually faced no repercussions for not attending or acknowledging a
BART meeting, nor could Speech First, Inc., for the university
students, demonstrate that the threats carried weight, and therefore, not
empty.145 The Seventh Circuit further pointed out the since the
“majority of students decline to meet [this] signals that students do not
fear consequences from the refusal to participate.”146
When also discussing the practicalities and realities of these two
programs, there are notable differences for the effect that each
university’s policy had on students. The University of Michigan
students were able to allege that speech was ‘chilled” and that threats
or noncompliance in attending a meeting or adhere to the program did
carry weight and could carry some sort of punishment, even though it
was minimal.147 The University of Illinois students, while it had the
Sixth Circuit’s Schlissel decision as a persuasive example, failed to
illustrate the impact that the BART policy had on them. Speech First
also had no firsthand knowledge of the BART policy and protocol,
therefore, the information obtained in this lawsuit against the
university was akin to secondhand knowledge.148 By refusing to give
Speech First associational standing here in Killeen, the Seventh Circuit
logically parted ways with the Sixth Circuit and demonstrated the
142

Id. at 765.
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 643-44.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 640.
147
Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d at 756.
148
Speech First, Inc., 968 F. 3d at 634.
143
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effectiveness of properly alleging injury in fact for standing doctrine
questions and cases.
A second comparison and parallel between Schlissel and Killeen
also happened regarding the issue of mootness for each of these
cases.149 Both the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits analyzed both of
these issues through the standing and mootness doctrine to produce
justiciable and viable outcomes for all parties involved. The standing
doctrine, while arguably a brick wall for some lawsuits, rationally and
logically selects cases that result in actual issues reaching resolutions,
instead of intangible results for unrealized problems. The mootness
doctrine also similarly functions in this way. It selects and carves out
instances in which it would be the most appropriate time for a court to
decide a lawsuit.
In adhering to the mootness principle, the Seventh Circuit created
an additional rule regarding the ripeness or correct timing of cases. In
Killeen, the student code section found to be the source of mootness in
the case was repealed seven weeks into the start of litigation.150 While
Judge Brennan stated that this was suspicious in his own dissent from
the panel, the Seventh Circuit found that the repeal of the student code
section did not warrant review by the court.151
This Seventh Circuit decision continues to close the door for First
Amendment issues by way of carefully construing parties who are
most appropriate to bring a grievance in to court. This narrowing does
not take away First Amendment freedoms, rather it supposes a correct
disposition of a complaint to adhere to the old standing doctrine that
continuously evolves.
ANALYSIS
149

In Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 936 F.3d at 646, the majority held that the
Student Code provision was moot. In Speech First, Inc., v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d at
770, the University of Michigan did not put forth enough affirmative action for the
Sixth Circuit to find the case not moot. Even with using the same blackletter law, the
Sixth Circuit instructed a rigid analysis of what constitutes as genuine and
affirmative regarding the repeal of a policy as to render a case moot.
150
Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 633.
151
Id. at 654-55.
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The Seventh Circuit held true to the tripartite scheme from the
1970s that developed into a carefully crafted and nuanced test
regarding a party’s standing. The Seventh Circuit did not condemn
Speech First, Inc. for choosing to file this case as an association.152 It
held that Speech First, Inc. did not demonstrate an injury in fact, a
legally recognized cause of action, when disapproving of the
University’s policies.153 Therefore, this case does not expect future
litigants to always have an individual party as a plaintiff, but asks that
litigants have a more traditionally recognized and sound injury when
filing a case in federal court.154
In further detailing and explaining that the injury was not “in fact”
as required by traditional standing doctrine jurisprudence, the Seventh
Circuit correctly held that there was no “credible threat” felt by
students about content-based regulation or coerced self-censorship
from BART, BIP, or the NCDs.155 When students’ speech had no
formal or University-recognized enforcement that required the
students to change their opinions or stop their speech altogether, this is
not indicative of any “chilling” or censorship. Rather, the policies,
based on University statistics serve as a processional tool in allowing
students to bridge ideological gaps through a valid learning
opportunity and optional conversation.156 The Seventh Circuit was
correct in finding that a completely optional ability to participate in a
learning experience cannot be a realized injury, nor can it be a
hypothesized injury.157
In returning to other associations or organization that have
attempted to file suit on behalf of its members in the Seventh Circuit,
152 Id. at 638 (clarifying that associational standing would readily apply to
Speech First “if its members were to have standing, Speech First would have
associational standing,” and that no party contests this on appeal).
153 Id. at 633.
154 Lee, supra note 14, at 178-79 (commenting on how “injury in fact” must
be realized and not hypothesized).
155 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 644, 647.
156
Id. at 632.
157
Id. at 634.
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those claims have been dismissed for reasons other than standing. Two
COVID-19 cases filed during mid-2020 illustrate that the Seventh
Circuit will still find that associational standing is valid and will
continue to bypass cases that cannot satisfy all three elements of the
tripartite scheme of injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. First,
the Seventh Circuit held that the Northern District of Illinois correctly
denied two church’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that sought an injunction to
Governor J.B. Pritzker’s Executive Order 2020-32.158 The Executive
Order prohibited “[a]ll public and private gatherings of any number of
people occurring outside a single household or living unit” except for
essential purposes.159 The Seventh Circuit focused its analysis on the
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, where the churches alleged discrimination of
their religion in violation of the First Amendment because of the size
restriction of gatherings and general condemnation of large gathering
that the churches would have.160 The Seventh Circuit found no need
for a standing analysis, nor did it find that the church did not have
standing to file a claim on behalf of its members, therefore,
demonstrating that associational standing is valid in the circuit.
Second, when the Illinois Republican Party filed a First
Amendment claim against Governor Pritzker, the Seventh Circuit was,
again, willing to overlook the standing analysis that it gave to Speech
First, Inc.161 The Illinois Republican Party alleged that the religious
carve-out exception in Executive Order 43 violated the Party’s right to
free speech under the First Amendment, as Governor Pritzker only
exempted religious activities from Executive Order 43.162 It focused
on the merits of the complaint against the Governor’s Executive Order
and alleged disparate treatment of religious groups and political

158

Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341, 347 (7th Cir.

2020).

159

Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-38 (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/
Pages/Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-32.aspx.
160
Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, 962 F.3d at 342.
161
Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2020).
162
Id. at 761-62.
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groups.163 The Seventh Circuit held that a preliminary injunction
against the Executive Order was unwarranted, as Governor Pritzker
could exempt or allow for religious activities under Executive Order
43 while declining to do the same for other types of activities.164 The
Seventh Circuit’s willingness to analyze the case’s merits continues to
demonstrate that associational standing, if pled correctly by a plaintiff,
will allow for a case and controversy in the circuit.
Returning to the standing and doctrine question analyzed in
Speech First, Inc., the Seventh Circuit further developed the standing
doctrine and the mootness doctrine. The adherence to the tripartite
scheme and its many nuances in determining what a credible threat or
injury in fact entails creates room for courts to explore and outline
instances in which a particularized injury in fact is realized, and
therefore, creates standing for a plaintiff’s case or controversy.
The Seventh Circuit further analyzed the meaning of “injury in
fact” for its circuit, not wanting to overreach politically or legislatively
into other branches of the federal government.165 Additionally, by
finding Speech First’s complaint as moot, it prevented an advisory
decision that would be in opposition to courts’ main function of
resolving “live” disputes between parties so that any redress has an
immediate impact, rather than one in theory.166 Speech First, Inc. v.
Killeen will not be the last case of its kind, as the issue of students’
First Amendment rights at college will continue to progress and
permeate through other campuses. However, the Seventh Circuit,
similar to Abbott and Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, created another
instructive decision that courts around the country may rely upon in
analyzing whether a policy does allege a particularized, realized injury
in fact worthy of standing.
163

Id. at 763-64. The Seventh Circuit also addressed mootness in Elim
Romanian Pentecostal Church, 962 F.3d at 344-45, and Illinois Republican Party,
973 F.3d at 763, where it found that the case was not moot if the Executive Orders at
issue in either case changed, since Governor Pritzker committed himself to possible
reinstatement of the Executive Orders dependent upon the state of the pandemic.
164
Id. at 764.
165
See Elliot, supra note 14, at 557.
166
Scott, supra note 39, at 773 (quoting Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91).
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CONCLUSION
The standing doctrine is a necessary prerequisite to address
legitimate concerns in federal courts. The Seventh Circuit
demonstrated the need for students themselves to bring claims of First
Amendment violations where there is actual injury and fear of a
chilling effect on speech. Merely proposing that a higher education
institution’s policies detract from students’ right to free inquiry and
meaningful speech and debate on a college campus does not help fix
the supposed free speech crisis currently happening across the country.
In order to find a more equitable solution to balancing a party’s rights
and grievances, it is best to adhere to Article III’s longstanding
tradition of requiring a proper party to bring a claim.
Further, mootness of certain student codes and the idea that the
alleged grievance should still be addressable by the time a court
decides the issue is also of utmost importance. The flexibility in the
doctrine of mootness allows for the door to a case or controversy to
remain slightly propped open in the Seventh Circuit for plaintiffs that
lack standing in the traditional sense with the tripartite scheme.
However, the doctrine of mootness is still useful in apportioning when
a case or controversy is most appropriately brought before a court.
Therefore, from one of its newest cases, the Seventh Circuit has
created a further understanding of the standing doctrine. Even though
this doctrine has long been criticized, it supports the efficiency of the
court system in saving the court’s time and parties’ money. The only
issue now is whether an independent free speech organization will
ever be able to establish an injury in a tangible way that the Seventh
Circuit will recognize.
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